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This paper analyses the relationship between active management and per-
formance in US equity mutual funds over the period 2001-2011 for both
gross and net returns. Active management is measured by time-varying pa-
rameters, idiosyncratic risk and turnover. A U-shaped relation is found, thus
both the best and the worst mutual funds show a higher level of active ma-
nagement. This behavior is also found in the relationship between expen-
ses and performance. Active management therefore implies selecting dif-
ferent strategies or investment bets with higher expenses and an unequal
performance is achieved. However some level of persistence in the success
of these bets is only found for the best mutual funds.
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M utual funds have developed significantly over the last decades, and a rich bodyof literature has emerged that analyzes how they are managed. One of themost relevant issues to attract both scholars’ and practitioners’ attention isfund performance, namely, managers’ ability to provide added value and toachieve better results than when a passive management strategy is followed.
The extensive literature published on the topic has been influenced by the evo-
lution of asset pricing models. Pioneering studies in this field are those of Sharpe
(1966), Treynor (1966) and Jensen (1968). The application of conditional models
considering the economic information available to managers has also been proposed
by Ferson and Schadt (1996) and Christopherson et al. (1998), among others. Since
the contributions of Sharpe (1992), Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997), the
use of multifactor models has become widespread. In these models mutual fund re-
turns are adjusted to their style, benchmarks or risk factors, as recently shown by
Kosowski et al. (2006), Bollen and Busse (2005), Busse et al. (2010) and Fama and
French (2010), among others.
(*) The authors acknowledge the financial support provided by research projects ECO2017-85746-
P (Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad) and UJI-B2017-14 (Universitat Jaume I). The
usual disclaimer applies.
Within this context, some literature has been concerned with the relationship be-
tween active management and performance. Sharpe (1991, 1992) showed the relevant
role of residual risk in active management. He noted that to provide value added and
to beat the market, a mutual fund must differentiate itself from the benchmarks. This
difference implies the existence of tracking error, which in turn produces residual risk
or idiosyncratic risk. In this line, Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Basak et al. (2007),
and Chen and Pennacchi (2009) indicate that managers have an incentive to increase
idiosyncratic risk if they are evaluated on their performance relative to a benchmark.
However, there is a puzzle in the literature regarding the relationship between ac-
tive management and performance. On the one hand, Kacperczyk et al. (2005) point
out that, on average, mutual funds perform better when they deviate from the bench-
mark and concentrate their holdings in industries where they have informational ad-
vantages. Cremers and Petajisto (2009) find that funds outperform benchmarks when
they have greater differences in portfolio holdings as compared to the benchmarks.
Amihud and Goyenko (2013) point out that lower R2, that is, higher idiosyncratic risk,
indicates greater selectivity and it significantly predicts better performance, whereas
Huij and Derwall (2011) find that concentrated funds with higher levels of tracking er-
ror perform better than their more broadly diversified counterparts. On the other
hand, Huang et al. (2011) find that funds’ poor performance is driven by the increase
in their idiosyncratic risk levels, which occurs when funds increase portfolio concen-
tration. One argument that could reconcile this result with the above is that proposed
by Casavecchia and Hulley (2013), who found evidence of a U-shaped relationship be-
tween performance and fees, and between performance and idiosyncratic risk.
The main aim of our study is therefore to shed light on this puzzle. In order to
do so, we formulate a framework in which managers implement investment strate-
gies with the aim of adding value to the mutual fund. We show how assessing fund
performance is equivalent to assessing the performance of the strategies the fund pur-
sues. In order to provide a nonzero abnormal performance, the results of these strate-
gies should differ from those obtained by passive investment in the benchmark or
factors of the performance model. As noted above, active fund management adds
value when differentiation and idiosyncratic risk are involved. Our hypothesis fol-
lows that approach: active management involves differentiation and this, in turn, leads
to an abnormal performance different from zero.
We contribute by proposing a more general approach, contrary to what is
stated in some of the literature, without directly assuming that differentiation and
idiosyncratic risk imply better performance. We actually propose that a U-shaped re-
lationship may exist between active management and performance, which explains
the puzzle related to the conflicting evidence found by the literature [Huang et al.
(2011) and Amihud and Goyenko (2013), among others]. We also attempt to con-
tribute to the literature by considering other variables apart from idiosyncratic risk
as proxies to measure the level of active management. Indeed a mutual fund could
show idiosyncratic risk even following a passive strategy only because it does not
replicate exactly the benchmarks or style factors. Thus, unlike the contributions of
Cremers and Petajisto (2009) and Amihud and Goyenko (2013), we also measured
active management by analyzing the dynamics of the fund’s risk level.
We assess mutual fund performance considering both net and gross returns for
several reasons. The first is that the use of mutual fund net returns is of more inter-
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est to investors because they match investors’ returns (without front-end and back-
end fees). In addition, as our objective is to analyze active management, is more ap-
propriate to use gross returns since they are not biased by the relationship between
active management and fees. This effect is especially relevant for our objectives,
given that previous studies have found a relationship between the two variables [e.g.
Casavecchia and Hulley (2013)], so our contribution must be made with gross re-
turns in order to show that the relationship between performance and active man-
agement is not driven by fees. Secondly, we also analyze the performance persistence,
and in this case there is previous evidence showing how persistence in fees can lead
to evidence of persistence in performance. Gottesman and Morey (2007) attribute
persistence to the expense ratio and, in the same vein, Fama and French (2010) iden-
tify costs as the source of persistence. Although using net returns is of greater interest
to investors, we should use gross returns to find out, in an effective manner, if the
results of active management are persistent over time.
Our results corroborate the main hypothesis: a U-shaped relationship between
active management and performance, i.e., the most actively managed funds do
achieve an abnormal performance farther from zero, but with both negative and pos-
itive signs. Nevertheless, funds with a low level of active management have an ab-
normal performance close to zero. Our hypothesis also implies a U-shaped relation-
ship between performance and fund expenses, given that a greater level of active
management involves more expenses giving full support to our hypothesis. Our re-
sults are in line with Casavecchia and Hulley (2013), who also found a U-shaped re-
lationship. However, our approach differs from that of these authors, who propose a
theoretical model that explains what the relationship between performance and fees
should be. The underlying economic intuition is quite straightforward: since invest-
ing in an index portfolio incurs no cost, investors have no reason to pay fees to a fund
manager; but they pay fees for the net alpha they expect to produce, relative to its level
of idiosyncratic risk. Unlike this study, we do not rely on the relationship between fees
and idiosyncratic risk; rather we propose a broader model that explains the relation-
ship between active management and performance based on market efficiency. In mar-
kets with high efficiency, manager strategies will obtain an abnormal performance far-
ther from zero, but for either positive or negative values, which produces the U-shaped
relationship. In fact, in our empirical work this evidence is found for the analysis with
both gross and net returns, so this relationship is not driven by the specific relation-
ship between fees and active management. Another difference is that not only do we
measure active management through idiosyncratic risk, but we also propose alterna-
tive measures, which enhances the robustness of our results. Our study contributes to
the literature by relating these results with the characteristics of the mutual funds, find-
ing that the best and worst funds are smaller in size1.
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(1) As Indro et al. (1999) and Beckers and Vaughan (2001) point out, the active management variable
could be related to size and performance, and as such, small funds may be more agile than large funds
in moving their investments across markets. On the other hand, the big popular mutual funds with a
large number of investors might be more cautious about moving their assets if restricted investment
targets are imposed. Thus, small funds may be more active and distant from the market, whereas big
funds may follow a strategy more closely linked to the market. Casavecchia and Hulley (2013) also
find that small funds show intensive rebalancing, idiosyncratic risk and higher management fees.
Related to the results noted above, we go a step further and analyze the reasons
for this finding. Why can active funds achieve both the best and the worst perfor-
mance? To answer this question, we carry out a fairly typical performance persis-
tence analysis from the financial literature2. When considering gross returns our re-
sults provide no evidence of performance persistence, except for the best funds,
although its economic impact is moderate. Whether among these best funds, we se-
lected those on the top, we find higher level of persistence. It seems therefore that
these funds do have greater ability to persistently select strategies that provide pos-
itive abnormal performance. This result is consistent with the evidence obtained by
Amihud and Goyenko (2013) who found significant positive abnormal performance
for mutual funds with best past performance and high active management. Our re-
sults for the rest of funds, including those with the worst performance, seem to be
driven by unsuccessful bets rather than persistence in poor management ability.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1 proposes the re-
lationship between performance and active management. In section 2, the data is de-
scribed. Section 3 contains the empirical results, grouped into the following sub-sec-
tions: performance; active management; the role of management and expenses;
persistence; and finally non-survivor mutual funds. Section 4 highlights the main con-
clusions of this study.
1. THE PERFORMANCE OF ACTIVE MANAGEMENT
We express as Vp,t-1 the value of the assets of mutual fund p at moment t-1, i.e.,
at the beginning of period t. We propose a model in which mutual fund managers
take a number of J investment decisions in their active management during period
t. Each decision may be expressed as a strategy Sj,t which produces an earning Ej,t
and involves a management expense fj,t (including management fees). At the end of
the period the new value of the assets of the mutual fund may be expressed by [1]:
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(2) From the previous literature, it can be inferred that the funds with the highest level of active man-
agement pursue differentiated investment strategies. The results of these strategies are not fully or par-
tially captured by the performance model, which leads to the fund’s nonzero abnormal performance.
If we consider investment strategies as a bet on the evolution of assets and markets, it is interesting
to analyze whether the outcome of these bets is random, or whether it is a consequence of managers’
ability. One way to conduct this analysis is to assess the persistence of performance. Several studies
have been concerned about the performance persistence of mutual funds, i.e., whether managers con-
sistently outperform (or underperform) the market [see Carhart (1997), Bollen and Busse (2005),
Kosowski et al. (2006), Busse et al. (2010), Fama and French (2010), and Abdelsalam et al. (2014),
among others]. In this line, another contribution of our study will be to analyze active management
and performance persistence. A lower level of persistence would imply that the strategies’ performance
does not follow a successful pattern over time, but that it is the random outcome of winning or los-
ing a bet. On the other hand, however, a higher level of performance persistence would imply that man-
agers really have the ability to select and develop winning or losing strategies.
[1]∑( )= + −−V V E fp t p t j t j t
j
, , 1 , ,
The net return of the mutual fund for the t period Rp,t can be expressed as [2].
Considering the return of the strategies in relative terms Rj,t and the expense ratio ep,t,
the net return of the mutual fund can be expressed by [3].
Managers may pursue a wide range of strategies. These can be grouped accor -
ding to the level of active management involved. Thus, a simple, passive strategy
would be to invest in a diversified stock portfolio, for instance replicating a stock in-
dex. In this case, as a buy and hold strategy, the net return of the fund would be equal
to the weighted return of the assets in the portfolio at the beginning of the period less
the expense ratio. At the other extreme, an example of active management would be
an intraday arbitrage, so that an additional income is obtained that is not necessar-
ily linked to assets included in the portfolio at the beginning of the period.
Typically managers’ strategies are not observable, so an external analyst cannot
know what strategies are pursued and what results they yield. In some cases, part of
this problem could be solved using portfolio holdings with appropriate frequency.
However portfolio holdings have other problems, the main one being that reported in-
formation is a snapshot of the portfolio composition on a specific date, so interim trad-
ing bias may be present if observation frequency is low [Elton et al. (2010) and Fulk-
erson (2013)]. On this point, Puckett and Yan (2011) state that “studies that use
quarterly data commonly assume that all trades occur at the end of the quarter, but
in fact they could occur at any time within the quarter”. Additionally, portfolio hold-
ing information may not be available and may be incomplete. At best, the available
information is the daily net asset value of the fund, which allows the analyst to cal-
culate net returns. This information is crucial since net return is the aggregate of the
funds’ results from their strategies less their expenses. Consequently this information
is very useful because active fund management can be evaluated by comparing the
funds’ results with those obtained by passive management [Sharpe (1991), (1992)].
In the literature it is frequently the case that passive management is identified with a
set of factors, or benchmarks, in the context of a linear model such as [4],
Active management and mutual fund performance
47
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[3]∑= −R R ep t j t p t
j
, , ,
[4]∑α β ε= + +R Fp t p p i i t p t
i
, , , ,
where Rp,t represents the net return of the fund from two consecutive net asset val-
ues. On the right, αp measures abnormal performance by comparing the net return
of the fund with the expected return, and defined by a set of slopes βp,i with respect
to the benchmarks or factors Fi,t, for i = 1 to N. Finally, εp,t is the error term of the
model and t takes value from 1 to T periods. Given that [4] assesses mutual fund net
returns and, as shown in [3], they derive from the fund’s strategies and expenses then
mutual fund abnormal performance is the result of assessing the net returns of the
strategies with the same model. Therefore, returns yielded from strategies may also
be assessed individually in [5].
[5]∑α β ε= + +R Fj t j j i i t j t
i
, , , ,
And considering [3] we obtain:
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[6]∑∑∑∑α β ε= + + −R F ep t j j i i t j t
jij
p t
j
, , , , ,
Comparing [6] with [4], and assuming that the expenses are uncorrelated with
the factors and the error term, we obtain expressions [7]-[9]:
[7]∑ ∑α α= −T e1p jj p tt ,
[8]∑β β=p i j i
j
, ,
[9]∑ε ε=p t j t
j
, ,
Expression [7] shows how the fund’s abnormal performance is the result of
adding the abnormal performance of the strategies less the expenses they incur. Ob-
viously, for a fund the alpha estimated from net returns will be less than that estimated
from gross returns, but fundamentally the fund’s result depends on the results yielded
by its strategies. Indeed, it is interesting to analyze how in [5] the strategies contribute
to abnormal performance. For instance, for the sake of simplicity we consider that ep,t
is zero and that expression [5] includes the return of the stock market as the only risk
factor. In this context let us first consider the case of an index fund and that it there-
fore pursues an investment strategy that replicates the stock market. In this case, the
market correlation is 1, the model [5] fully explains the fund’s returns and the alpha
is zero. Logically, the fund would only obtain a nonzero alpha when, at some point,
it differentiates itself from the market in order to obtain different returns. Sharpe (1991,
1992) shows that to beat the market or benchmark the fund must follow an active man-
agement approach involving a differentiation which generally implies an increase in
the residual variance of model [4] and consequently, through [9] and supposing inde-
pendency among residuals, also in [5]. Second, let us consider the extreme example
of a hedge fund that follows investment strategies which provide independent returns
compared to those from the market. In this case, the beta would be zero, the percent-
age of residual variance would be 100% and the alpha performance would be the av-
erage fund return. In summary, the index fund (hedge fund) represents an extreme case
of minimum (maximum) differentiation that involves an abnormal performance equal
(possibly different) to (from) zero. The two examples show two opposite sides of man-
agement and how differentiation brings about nonzero performance.
As Sharpe (1992) points out, in the context of a linear model the differentiation
or active management would possibly be reflected in a higher level of residual vari-
ance. However, if this differentiation involves certain dynamism in the management
of the portfolio, this could be captured by a model that allows the parameters to be
estimated as time-varying. Therefore, if a model is subject to different time periods,
for example by a rolling window estimation, the differentiation may also be reflected
in an increased variability of these parameters over time. On the other hand, a greater
differentiation would imply higher portfolio management costs, in that it involves
active management with higher market analysis costs, higher turnover and higher
portfolio managers’ fees.
Consequently, to measure the funds’ performance we use a linear model [4] with
five factors as shown in [10]; the first is the implicitly risk free return since the funds’
performance, rp,t, is measured in excess of it. The rest are the risk factors from the Fama
and French (1993) model: excess market return rm,t, the return of small stocks minus
the return of big stocks rsmb,t, and the difference of the return between high and low
book-to-market ratio stocks rhml,t; and from Carhart (1997): the momentum factor, the
return of past winner stocks minus the return of past loser stocks rwml,t. The details of
how these factors are constructed may be consulted on French’s website (2011).
rp,t = αp + βp,m rm,t + βp,smb rsmb,t + βp,hml rhml,t + βp,wml rwml,t + εp,t [10]
This model has been widely applied in the recent mutual fund literature by
Kacperczyk et al. (2005), Kosowski et al. (2006), Gallo et al. (2007), Huij and Ver-
beek (2007), Fama and French (2010), Busse et al. (2010), Huij and Derwall (2011),
Vicente et al. (2011) and Hackethal et al. (2012), among others.
In sum, fund managers make a series of investment decisions or strategies. As
these strategies are being assessed by model [10], the fund’s performance under the
same model depends on the performance of the strategies. In general, these strate-
gies lead to a nonzero abnormal performance insofar as they provide different results
from those of the factors in [10]. The higher the differentiation, the greater the pos-
sibilities of obtaining an abnormal performance far from zero. By applying an un-
conditional model the differentiation is reflected in a higher level of residual risk.
However, when a conditional model using a rolling window is applied, this differ-
entiation may cause time-variance in the parameters of the model. The existence of
specific risk and/or time-varying parameters provides evidence of differentiation that
may be the result of a greater degree of active portfolio management. With respect
to the above it is important again to recall that the investment decisions or strategies
managers follow are not observable; only their aggregate result can be perceived.
Therefore, it must be remembered that the existence of evidence linked to active man-
agement, such as residual variance and time-varying parameters, actually indicates
the presence of differentiation from passive management, which is represented by
the set of betas and factors on the right side of model [10].
This paper analyzes the relationship between active management and perfor-
mance. Our hypothesis is that active management involves differentiation and it leads
to a performance different from zero. In a context of markets with a low level of ef-
ficiency, theoretically one would expect that better informed professional managers
would be able to implement differentiation strategies to achieve a persistently posi-
tive abnormal performance over time. In contrast, in a context of markets with a higher
level of efficiency, it is less likely that managers would be able to implement strate-
gies that persistently obtain a positive performance. In fact, in this latter case, the
strategies could resemble bets on certain assets, asset classes or markets whose re-
sult could even be purely random. As a consequence, greater differentiation implies
a greater bet and therefore a performance farther from zero, but both positive and neg-
ative. If greater differentiation implies more active management, turnover and fees,
we would not expect these variables to be linearly related with performance; rather,
a U-shaped relationship would be found since both worst and best mutual funds would
show higher levels of differentiation.
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2. DATA
The empirical analysis is applied to a sample of US domestic equity mutual
funds. In the US, as in other markets, the number of mutual funds has increased no-
tably in recent decades. The sample period runs from March 1, 2001 to May 3, 2011.
Specifically, 2,273 mutual funds from the Morningstar database are considered. Mu-
tual funds are split into two subsamples: the first consists of 1,428 funds with com-
plete data over the sample period, i.e., survivor funds; the second contains 845 funds
that died in this period, i.e., non-survivor funds. If these funds are omitted from the
analysis, aggregate performance results may be positively biased because these funds
usually achieve, on average, a worse abnormal performance than survivor funds, as
pointed out by Brown and Goetzmann (1995), Elton et al. (1996) and Deaves
(2004). However, presenting aggregate results including both survivor and non-sur-
vivor funds may produce additional bias due to the relative robustness of results ob-
tained for a scarce sample in the case of some non-survivors. Rohleder et al. (2011)
point out that individual fund performance measurement requires a return history of
a certain length to generate reliable regression estimates. For this reason, the results
are presented separately except for the persistence analysis case, since it is not pos-
sible to estimate the ex-post performance of non-survivor funds.
Model (10) was applied with both net and gross mutual fund returns. From the
point of view of investors, it is more interesting to estimate the performance with net
returns since this is the return they typically obtain. If the aim is to analyze the re-
sult of fund management before expenses, it is more appropriate to use gross returns.
Moreover, in analyzing persistence in performance it is relevant to consider gross re-
turns because some previous studies, such as Carhart (1997), Gottesman and Morey
(2007) and Fama and French (2010), identify expenses as the source of persistence.
Daily net returns are computed by comparing the NAV (the net asset value of the
fund) for daily dates, and considering any distributed gain. We compute gross returns
by adding fund expenses to net returns. On the right of model (10), the daily returns
of the three Fama and French factors, the Carhart momentum factor and the risk free
asset (the one-month Treasury bill rate) are taken from French’s website (2011).
Other mutual fund data from Morningstar used in the analysis are annual expense
ratio, annual turnover ratio and size. Expense ratio is the annual fee that the fund
charges its shareholders, expressed as the percentage of assets deducted each fiscal
year for fund expenses, including management fees, administrative fees, operating
costs and other asset-based costs incurred by the fund. Turnover is a measure of the
fund’s trading activity that, following the Morningstar definition, is computed by tak-
ing the lesser of purchases or sales (excluding all securities with maturities of less than
one year) and dividing by average monthly net assets. A low turnover figure (0.20 to
0.30) would indicate a buy-and-hold strategy. High turnover (more than 1) would in-
dicate an investment strategy involving considerable buying and selling of securities.
In the rest of the paper we sometimes use the variable log (turnover) to facilitate the
analysis and representation. Lastly, size is measured at the beginning of the period
sample, i.e., March 2001. In this way we avoid introducing a spurious correlation be-
tween size and performance, because if the average fund size is used, that size may
have increased implicitly due to good fund performance, both because of increasing
Revista de Economía Aplicada
50
assets through the cumulative effect of positive stock returns, and due to the post feed-
back between performance and net flows of money into the fund [Sirri and Tufano
(1998) and Matallín-Sáez (2011)]. In the rest of the paper mutual fund size is ex-
pressed in terms relative to the assets of all the mutual funds in the sample.
Panel A of Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics for the mutual funds sam-
ple. The average of the gross annualized return of the funds is 8.06%, and after con-
sidering expenses the average is 6.85%. The median is lower, showing that the cross-
sectional distribution of the mutual funds mean return is positively skewed by good
mutual funds. On the right of Panel A non-survivor mutual funds show lower returns
than survivor funds. The mean is now lower than the median, i.e., the mean is driven
to some extent by the worst mutual funds. In fact, at 10% of the cross-sectional dis-
tribution of the mean of the non-survivor funds’ returns, they show most negative re-
turns: -14.84% annual and -15.49% annual for gross and net returns, respectively. Non-
survivor mutual funds show high levels of expenses, turnover and size. On the other
hand, and related with factors of model [10], Panel B of Table 1 shows the annualized
mean of daily return and risk (measured by the s.d. of the returns) for these data.
3. RESULTS
The next sections report the results for survivor mutual funds. The last section
provides the results for non-survivor mutual funds.
3.1. Performance
Table 2 shows the results for unconditional and conditional performances of the
1,428 US survivor mutual funds. In both cases, model [10] is used to measure per-
formance with daily returns. In the first case, the estimation of the model is for the
whole of the sample period and in the second case, the estimation is conditioned to
short sample periods by means of a non-overlapping monthly rolling window3. The
results are displayed with funds grouped by deciles and ranked from worst to best
according to conditional performance. The last row represents the average for the en-
tire sample. Panel A (B) shows the results when gross (net) mutual fund returns were
used in the performance estimation.
The results are similar to those obtained in the previous literature on mutual fund
performance. Thus, for net returns (Panel B) most of the funds have a nonzero per-
formance, although more cases of negative performance appear, and evidence is
found of underperformance at the aggregate level. Performance improves for gross
returns (Panel A), but on average it is close to zero, although with a small number
of funds with performance significantly different from zero.
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(3) The monthly window estimation captures the variability of the parameters in model [10] with two
objectives: [1] to measure time-varying conditional performance; and [2] to measure the variability
of the factor parameters as a proxy of active management. Obviously the selection of a wide (reduced)
window decreases (increases) the variability of the parameters. Hence, a monthly window is an in-
termediate size that, since we use daily returns, allows time-varying parameters while maintaining a
certain level of robustness [see e.g. Agarwal et al. (2011), Matallín-Sáez (2011) and Engle et al. (2013),
among others]. When return data are not daily but monthly, the windows must be larger in order to
maintain this robustness [see e.g. Andreu et al. (2009) and Yin (2016), among others].
3.2. Measuring active management
In this section we want to assess the degree of differentiation or active fund man-
agement. Our interest focuses on certain variables. The first of these is turnover, as
we noted above, data for which is taken directly from the Morningstar database that
measures the percentage of the portfolio’s holdings that have changed over the past
year. We compute the mean of the annual turnover data for each mutual fund. As
proxies of active management we use a set of variables derived from the application
of model [10]. In the unconditional approach, the percentage of idiosyncratic risk of
the mutual fund is used. It is measured as one minus the value of the determination
coefficient of the regression. In the conditional approach we estimate the idiosyn-
cratic risk in a similar way, but considering the mean of the determination coefficient
of the rolling regressions. Also in this approach we compute the standard deviation
of the time-varying parameters of model [10] estimated in the rolling regressions,
as proxies of active management. It is feasible to expect that more active managers
sometimes change the composition of the portfolio in an attempt to select underpriced
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Table 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE MUTUAL FUNDS IN THE SAMPLE
Panel A
Survivor mutual funds Non-survivor mutual funds
10% 90% 10% 90%
Mean Median Perc. Perc. Mean Median Perc. Perc.
Gross return 8.06% 7.50% 4.71% 12.29% -0.79% 1.58% -14.84% 7.49%
Net return 6.85% 6.31% 3.48% 10.99% -2.11% 0.21% -15.49% 6.23%
Expense ratio 1.22% 1.24% 0.60% 1.75% 1.32% 1.35% 0.00% 2.04%
Turnover 78.41 66.51 17.04 160.09 98.81 80.83 21.60 186.20
Initial size 1,566.28 256.32 15.03 2,691.69 1,597.87 359.01 30.44 3,441.75
Panel B
Factors Annualized mean return Annualized s.d.
Market 6.74% 21.47%
Smb 7.32% 9.36%
Hml 6.12% 9.82%
Wml 3.47% 17.55%
Risk free asset 2.02% 0.11%
The sample period runs from March 1, 2001 to May 3, 2011, and considers 2,273 US equity mutual
funds from Morningstar database. Mutual funds are split into two subsamples, 1,428 survivor funds
and 845 non-survivor funds. Returns are annualized from daily data. Initial size is measured as as-
sets in USD millions on March 2001.
Source: Own elaboration.
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stocks and time the market. Therefore, more actively managed portfolios will tend
to show higher levels of turnover, idiosyncratic risk and variability of the parame-
ters in model [10]. To analyze this, first we rank mutual funds in deciles according
to turnover from low to high values. Then we compute the average of the values of
the variables defined above across each decile and construct Figure 1. As the figure
shows, there is a common behavior across the variables: the first decile shows lower
values than the last decile for all the variables. As turnover increases, the values of
these variables, i.e., the active management of the mutual funds, also increase.
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Figure 1: MEASURING ACTIVE MANAGEMENT
Funds are grouped in deciles from low to high turnover. In the plot, turnover is showed as log (tur-
nover). Estimates are from results of applying model [10] with gross returns.
Source: Own elaboration.
Table 3 shows the correlations from the data presented in Figure 1. Note that
the correlation between variables is high, especially for the standard deviation of the
parameters estimated from the conditional estimation by means of a monthly rolling
window. For this reason, Table 4 reports the results of the univariate regressions be-
tween the variables that proxy active management. In all of them, the dependent vari-
able is the log of the turnover. In the regressions the p-values of the slope are espe-
cially significant for the case of the alpha s.d. and the market, smb, hml, wml betas
s.d. When the unconditional model is applied, the active management is captured by
the tracking error (or error term), i.e., the idiosyncratic risk. However if the condi-
tional model is applied, the possibility of incorporating time-varying parameters cap-
tures the active management, and then the idiosyncratic risk is less relevant (the R2
is reduced from 0.222 to 0.069). In Table 4, the highest explanatory power is for the
case of the alpha and betas s.d., i.e., a higher proportion of the differences in turno -
ver across deciles is explained by the time-varying parameters in model [10]. With
regard to the alpha s.d. variable, it implies that higher (lower) turnover entails higher
(lower) variability of the alpha, i.e., the abnormal performance achieved by the fund,
and probably less (more) persistence in performance. Regarding the time-varying be-
tas, these results indicate that the application of model [10] provides an accurate read-
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Table 3: CORRELATION BETWEEN ACTIVE MANAGEMENT MEASURES
Uncon. Cond. Market Smb Hml Wml
idioync. idioync. Alpha beta beta beta beta Log
risk risk s.d. s.d. s.d. s.d. s.d. (T.)
Unconditional
idiosyncratic risk 1
Conditional
idiosyncratic risk 0.869 1
Alpha s.d. 0.791 0.660 1
Market beta s.d. 0.865 0.721 0.983 1
Smb beta s.d. 0.860 0.703 0.987 0.990 1
Hml beta s.d. 0.749 0.573 0.988 0.966 0.978 1
Wml beta s.d. 0.788 0.569 0.974 0.973 0.978 0.980 1
Log(Turnover) 0.471 0.263 0.889 0.815 0.836 0.916 0.892 1
Correlation matrix between the decile mean of the variables that measure active management. Funds
are grouped in deciles from low to high turnover. Estimates are from results of applying model [10]
with gross returns.
Source: Own elaboration.
Table 4: TURNOVER AND ACTIVE MANAGEMENT
Constant Slope R2
Unconditional idiosyncratic risk 0.680 15.651 0.222
(0.377) (0.170)
Conditional idiosyncratic risk 0.928 10.963 0.069
(0.418) (0.462)
Alpha s.d. -0.721 13.344 0.791
(0.152) (0.001)
Market beta s.d. -0.445 15.278 0.664
(0.450) (0.004)
Smb beta s.d. -0.656 12.566 0.700
(0.279) (0.003)
Hml beta s.d. -1.003 9.316 0.839
(0.049) (0.000)
Wml beta s.d. -0.524 9.645 0.796
(0.241) (0.001)
Univariate regressions between log(turnover) as dependent variable. Values for regressions are decile
mean from results of applying model [10] with gross returns. Funds were grouped in deciles from low
to high turnover.
Source: Own elaboration.
ing of the level of active portfolio management. Therefore, the funds with a higher
level of rotation carry out more active management, which involves incorporating
higher time-varying betas in the conditional approach.
In sum, the estimated values  from model [10] are consistent with the directly
observable turnover data. Therefore, our results show how certain variables from the
application and interpretation of the model can be used as proxies of the degree of
active fund management. In this section the results are only reported for gross re-
turns since the results for the net returns case are practically the same.
3.3. Performance, active management and expenses
3.3.1. Performance estimated with gross returns
In this section we analyze the relation between active management, mutual fund
expenses and performance. For this purpose, first the sample mutual funds are
ranked according to performance from the conditional approach with gross returns
and then grouped in deciles. Decile 1 (D1) is formed with the worst mutual funds
and decile 10 (D10), with the best. Panel A of Table 5 shows the average of the deciles
for some mutual fund characteristics such as performance, size, idiosyncratic risk,
turnover, management fee and other expenses, and for the case of the conditional ap-
proach, alpha skewness and the standard deviation of the parameters of [10]. Figures
2a to 2f show the values of the variables in Table 5; recall that deciles are ranked ac-
cording to conditional performance.
In Figure 2a the conditional and unconditional performance increases across the
deciles, and practically all the performance is distributed equally between deciles with
negative and positive values. It is also notable that the unconditional performance is
greater than the conditional performance except for the last decile. As conditional per-
formance allows the parameter to be time-varying, the alpha captures the ability for
stock selection more precisely; it is perverse except for the best mutual funds of D10.
Nonetheless the figure shows how both unconditional and conditional performances
display a similar evolution; indeed the correlation between the mean values  in deciles
of both variables is 98.78%; and 70.62% for the single funds levels4. Figure 2a also
displays the average value of the skewness of the conditional alpha. As noted, skew-
ness increases with the performance: the worst funds exhibit negative skewness; in
D5 and D6 with abnormal performance close to zero the skewness is practically zero
and for the best funds, the skewness is positive. Since the skewness is estimated on
the distribution of conditional alphas obtained over the sample period in each mutual
fund, a negative skewness indicates that the worst funds obtain a lower mean, due to
the influence of certain moments in time in which those funds pursued active strate-
gies that yielded a result that was too negative than that expected for a normal dis-
tribution of these alphas. Skewness is positive for funds with better performance, but
a growing relationship between the two variables is not clearly perceived; in fact, in
D9 skewness is practically zero, while it is similar in D10 and D8, and in absolute
terms its value is approximately half that in D1 for the worst funds.
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(4) When funds are ranked according to conditional performance the results of this section are very
similar to those when funds are ranked according to unconditional performance; for this reason the
latter are omitted to save space.
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Figure 2: PERFORMANCE (ESTIMATED WITH GROSS RETURNS)
AND ACTIVE MANAGEMENT
Funds are grouped in deciles from low to high conditional performance. Estimates are from results of
performance from applying model [10] with gross returns. Performance is annualized.
Source: Own elaboration.
Figure 2b shows the variability of the parameters of model [10] when the con-
ditional approach is applied. This variability is measured as the standard deviation
of the parameter estimates from the monthly-window rolling regression. All the pa-
rameters display similar behavior, showing U-shaped lines in Figure 2b. This means
that both the worst and the best abnormal performances are achieved by mutual funds
with greater variability in the parameters which, as we noted in the previous section,
can be interpreted as a higher level of active management. On the other hand, funds
with intermediate values of abnormal performance  entail a lower parameter varia-
tion, which could imply less active management. This U-shaped relation is also cor-
roborated by the behavior of idiosyncratic risk as Figure 2d shows. Thus, funds with
more extreme performance are those with higher levels of idiosyncratic risk. However,
the levels of idiosyncratic risk are higher for the case of D10, i.e., the best mutual funds.
Perhaps based on the latter, some studies in the literature, including Kacperczyk et
al. (2005), Huij and Derwall (2011) and Amihud and Goyenko (2013) among oth-
ers, point out that high idiosyncratic risk implies better performance. However, we
show how the relation with respect to performance is U-shaped, which also coincides
with the results of Casavecchia and Hulley (2013). On the other hand, funds in the
valley, with lower idiosyncratic risk, are those with performance close to zero. So,
for both Figures 2b and 2d the valley area matches D5 and D6, just when the abnor -
mal performance changes from negative to positive values. The fact that even when
time-varying parameters are considered there is idiosyncratic risk implies that the
differences between active and passive management are not mainly driven by strate-
gies based on changes in systematic risk levels but by differentiation strategies based
on stock selection that produce returns showing little correlation to the factors in-
cluded in the model.
Figure 2c reports the average expenses of the mutual fund deciles, ranked by
conditional performance. The figure shows the expense ratio, namely, management
expenses as a percentage of assets. The difference between the two values is attrib-
utable to other fund expenses. The expense ratio including the management fee also
shows a similar U-shaped pattern, i.e., a higher level of expenses is reflected for the
best and worst funds’ performance. Thus, at the extremes of the line, i.e., D1 and D10,
the expense ratio is about 1.4% annual and the management fee about 0.8% annual.
On the other hand, the valley of the figure is between D5 and D6 when the perfor-
mance is close to zero. Casavecchia and Hulley (2013) also found a U-shaped rela-
tionship between performance and fees.
This same U-shaped behavior is also observed in Figure 2e, which represents the
average turnover within each decile of funds. Thus, funds in the valley are loca ted on
decile 5: when abnormal performance is virtually zero then the average turnover is
lower. However, from this point the turnover increases both on the right and on the
left, i.e., for both the best and the worst funds. Unlike the previous figures, this fig-
ure is not symmetrical: a comparison of D1 and D10 shows that the turnover of the
worst funds is higher than the top funds.
Finally, Figure 2f shows the average size of the funds in each decile. Although
a clear pattern cannot be inferred, it shows that funds with abnormal performance
close to zero, as in D5, are larger than the rest. At the extremes, both the worst and
the best funds are smaller and it is striking that in D10 the best performing funds are
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in fact the smallest funds. In relation to mutual fund size, Casavecchia and Hulley
(2013) find that small funds show high idiosyncratic risk and fees. Our results, as
Figures 2c, 2d and 2f show, reflect the same tendency.
In sum, the data in Table 5 and Figures 2a-2f allow us to infer, on average, cer-
tain characteristics of funds according to their performance. Thus, when funds are
ranked from worst to best performance, the funds both at the bottom and at the top
show: (a) alpha skewness with the same sign as abnormal performance; (b) higher
level of active management as evidenced by the higher time-varying parameters, idio-
syncratic risk and turnover; (c) higher management fee and consequently higher ex-
penses; and (d) smaller size of managed assets. But when the two groups of funds
are compared, the funds at the top exhibit lower alpha skewness and turnover but
higher idiosyncratic risk and smaller size than those at the bottom. On the other hand,
funds in central deciles, and therefore with performance close to zero, present
lower skewness, active management and fees.
Thus, as we postulated, funds that try to beat the market, represented by the fac-
tors of model [10], may be differentiated from the market by implementing strate-
gies that involve time-varying parameters, idiosyncratic risk and in consequence,
higher turnover. This high degree of active management is also accompanied by
higher expenses. That is, more active management commands a higher fee. However,
the results of these strategies can vary greatly, so that some funds achieve a nega-
tive and others a positive abnormal performance. Moreover the results of the strate-
gies are sometimes outliers that produce a skewed distribution of the conditional ab-
normal performance. This drives the abnormal performance on the left (right) for the
worst (best) mutual funds. Smaller funds also appear likely to pursue higher levels
of active management and achieve more mixed performance results. On the other
hand, funds that are not differentiated from the market display lower active man-
agement, lower fees and abnormal performance close to zero. This evidence is in line
with the theoretical proposals of Sharpe (1991 and 1992), in that funds that attempt
to beat the market must differentiate themselves from it.
3.3.2. Performance estimated with net returns
In general, the results using net returns (after expenses) of mutual funds are sim-
ilar to those discussed in the previous section using gross returns. Panel B of Table
5 and Figures 3a to 3f show the value of some characteristic variables of mutual fund
management with deciles again ranked from lowest to highest conditional perfor-
mance. Figure 3a shows the mean and skewness of the distribution of conditional per-
formance across deciles, and is very similar to Figure 2a. However, unlike the lat-
ter, the point when the performance is close to zero has now moved rightward,
specifically to deciles D7 and D8. Consequently, now the performance distribution
across deciles is asymmetric; in other words, the values of negative performance in
D1 are higher, in absolute terms, than the positive performance in D10. Figures 3b,
3c, 3d, 3e are very similar to those discussed for gross returns, although now in some
cases U-shaped behavior is seen more clearly and the turning point or valley has also
moved to the right in D7 and D8, precisely where the abnormal performance takes
values  close to zero. The conclusions reached with net returns are therefore the same
as those with gross returns. A difference is seen in Figure 3c: although U-shaped be-
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Figure 3: PERFORMANCE (ESTIMATED WITH NET RETURNS)
AND ACTIVE MANAGEMENT
Funds are grouped in deciles from low to high conditional performance. Estimates are from results of
performance from applying model [10] with net returns. Performance is annualized.
Source: Own elaboration.
havior remains, the expense ratio of the worst funds in decile 1 takes a value of 1.53%,
which is slightly greater than the value of 1.31% for the top funds in D10. This means
that when net returns are used, the higher amount from “other expenses” increases
the expense ratio of the funds and worsens the poorest performing funds. Figure 3f
shows even more clearly than Figure 2f that funds with worse and better performance
(D1 and D10) are smaller funds.
3.4. Performance persistence
The above results provide evidence that on average, mutual funds with higher
levels of active management show an abnormal performance farther from zero. As
we proposed in our theoretical presentation, assessing mutual funds is equivalent to
measuring the performance of their investment strategies. For some funds, these
strategies lead to positive performance but for others it is negative. An interesting
question arising from the above evidence is to analyze whether the results of these
strategies are to some extent due to luck or to managers’ ability. That is, strategies
could be perceived as active management bets, the results of which may be negative
or positive. In fact, as Figure 2a shows, the symmetry between positive and nega-
tive values  in the distribution of the abnormal performance from gross returns could
support this hypothesis. In the same vein, the fact that the worst and best funds
achieve their performance with greater time variance of the conditional alpha (as
shown in Figures 2b and 3b) and greater skewness (as shown in Figures 2a and 3a)
suggests that the alpha distribution is not uniform over time. It is therefore neces-
sary to analyze whether mutual funds develop strategies that achieve abnormal per-
formance with a certain degree of persistence.
For this purpose we apply a methodology similar to that proposed by Carhart
(1997), which has subsequently been used in a large number of studies in the per-
formance persistence literature such as Bollen and Busse (2005), Kosowski et al.
(2006), Busse et al. (2010), Fama and French (2010) and Abdelsalam et al. (2014),
among others. First, each month funds are ranked in ascending order according to
conditional performance. These funds are then grouped into deciles, with the worst
performing funds corresponding to the first decile through to the best performing
funds in the tenth decile. For each decile, we form a portfolio that follows a strat-
egy of investing in funds according to their past performance. For instance, D1 (D10)
is an equally-weighted portfolio that invests in funds that in the previous month were
included in the first (tenth) decile, i.e., the worst (best) funds from the previous pe-
riod. In the second month each portfolio starts investing according to the performance
of the first month and so on, and the portfolio is reviewed at the beginning of each
month until the end of the sample period. This allows us to identify the mutual funds
that form each decile-portfolio each month (except for the first period). With this data,
we estimate the abnormal performance of each decile-portfolio as the average of the
monthly conditional funds’ performance, estimated in Section 3.1 by model [10]. If
there were some degree of persistence it would be expected that a portfolio that in-
vests in the past worst (best) funds would achieve a poor (good) performance.
Results using gross returns are shown in Panel A of Table 6 and in Figure 4a, and
for net returns, in Panel B, and Figure 4b. In both cases a slight increase is seen in
the abnormal performance from the decile-portfolio that invests in the worst past mu-
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Figure 4: PERFORMANCE PERSISTENCE
Annualized conditional performance of portfolios based on past conditional performance from mo-
del [10].
Source: Own elaboration.
tual funds (D1) leading up to the decile-portfolio with the best past performance (D10).
Using gross returns, Panel A of Table 6 shows that the annual abnormal performance
of portfolios ranges from -1% (D1) to 1.63% (D10), but only for decile ten it is sig-
nificantly different from zero. Certainly this range does not represent a significant eco-
nomic impact. Compared to the performance of the funds, these values  are within the
range of 4.22% -4.32% as shown in Panel A of Table 2. These values  are also far from
the range reached in a hypothetical situation of maximum persistence, i.e., that in
which the worst and best funds continue in the same decile in the future; in this case
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Figure 4: TOP BEST AND WORST MUTUAL FUNDS:
PERFORMANCE PERSISTENCE (continuation)
Annualized conditional performance of portfolios based on past conditional performance from mo-
del [10]. Funds are grouped in centiles from low to high conditional performance. The horizontal axis
shows the centile.
Source: Own elaboration.
we calculate that the annual performance ranges between -33.2% for D1 and 33.6%
for D10. When using net returns, Panel B of Table 6 shows that the annual abnormal
performance of the decile-portfolios ranges from -2.42% for D1 to 0.32% for D10,
with significant values  for the first seven decile-portfolios. In this context, the pres-
ence of expenses in the funds has two main effects: (i) abnormal performance is re-
duced, and (ii) different levels of expenses among mutual funds contribute to evi-
dencing persistence. However, the range of -2.42% to 0.32% again does not imply a
significant economic impact when compared to the range achieved by the funds in
Panel B of Table 2 (-5.79% to 2.88% for D1 and D10) or the range that would be
achieved for the maximum persistence case (from -34.6% in D1 to 32.2% in D10).
Some studies point out the likelihood of finding evidence of persistence in the
effect of extreme values in the cross-sectional distribution of abnormal perfor-
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mance. We therefore repeat the previous analysis, but considering deciles within each
of the extreme deciles, i.e., centiles from 1% to 10% for the worst mutual funds and
91% to 100% for the best. Results are shown in panels C to F in Table 6 and in Fig-
ures 4c to 4f. With gross returns, Panel C shows how the result of following strate-
gies based on past performance among the worst mutual funds is negative and close
to zero, but only significant in cases C6 and C8 and with no trend, as shown in Fig-
ure 4c. However, Figure 4d does show a positive trend for the best funds, i.e., in-
vesting in the best funds leads to a better performance, which is particularly relevant
in centiles C99 and C100. This means that investing in 1% and 2% of the better clas-
sified funds in the previous month may lead to an annual performance of 3.21% and
3.48%, respectively, as shown in Panel D.
When using net returns, Panel E and Figure 4e show a negative performance,
but with no trend, for the worst mutual funds. In the case of the best funds, Panel C
and Figure 4f show a pattern similar to that for the case of gross returns, but with a
lower value of abnormal performance.
In sum, when gross returns are used there is no significant evidence of persis-
tence, except in the top decile of funds. With net returns, persistence in the expenses
incurred leads to persistence in most deciles, particularly in the worst funds. How-
ever, persistence has a moderate economic effect. When the deciles from the worst
and best funds are subdivided, we find evidence of a slight increase in the perfor-
mance achieved by investing in the 2% of the top best funds in the previous period.
This result is in line with those of other studies such as Lynch and Musto (2003), Co-
hen et al. (2005) and Kosowski et al. (2006), who found persistence among winners.
Such evidence is relevant to the extent that the investor should select the best past
funds in order to obtain good performance in the future.
3.5. Non-survivor mutual funds
We now report the results of the above analysis for non-survivor funds during
the sample period. First, Table 7 shows the performance results. A comparison of these
results with those presented in Table 2 shows how the non-survivor mutual funds
achieve, in aggregate, a worse performance than the survivor funds. For instance, con-
sidering gross returns, the conditional annualized performance ranges from -17.21%
in D1 to 4.94% in D10 while those values  are -4.32% and 4.22%, respectively, for the
case of survivor funds. Overall, the worst non-survivor funds have a particularly poorer
performance than the worst surviving funds. With respect to the mean performance
of the two groups, Table 8 shows the difference in performance between the non-sur-
vivor and survivor funds; in general, the performance of non-survivor funds is about
3% lower than that of the survivor funds. This evidence is similar to previous mutual
fund research such as Elton et al. (1996), Carhart et al. (2002) and Rohleder et al.
(2011), among others. It is clear that the non-survivor funds have a significant bias
whether or not they are included in the performance analysis of the funds industry.
Including them implies that funds with 100% data for a sample period are mixed with
others with a limited sample period, and therefore they are not comparable. Con-
versely, if they are omitted, as shown in Figure 2a, surviving funds would present a
certain symmetry in the cross-sectional performance distribution, when really the pres-
ence of non-survivor funds, as intuited from Figure 5a, leads to an asymmetric dis-
tribution due to the negative performance of the non-survivor funds.
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The results of the analysis of the relationship between performance, active man-
agement and expenses are shown in Table 9 and in Figure 5 when gross returns are
used (figures using net returns are quite similar and are not shown to save space).
They are similar to those of survivor funds presented in Table 5 and Figures 2 and
3, but with some differences. With gross returns, Figures 5b to 5e show U-shaped
behavior in the variables measuring active management and expenses. However, the
shape differs in that the valley of the figure is placed to the right, so that the values  
of the variables show a decrease from D1 to D8, followed by continuous growth
through D9 and D10. This behavior also coincides with the negative performance
in deciles D1 to D8, whereas in D9 and D10 it is positive. Therefore, as for the sur-
vivor mutual funds case, Figures 5b and 5d show that both the best and the worst
funds have a higher degree of differentiation with respect to model [10], i.e., as in-
terpreted above, a greater degree of active management. Figure 5d shows that the
idiosyncratic risk for D1 is slightly higher than for D10; however this result is con-
trary to that found for survival funds, where it was higher for D10 than for D1.
Figure 5c shows that the funds in the extreme deciles have higher expenses, but
they are even higher among the best performing non-survivor funds corresponding
to D10. Figure 5e shows that the worst funds have the highest turnover, and that it
decreases until decile D8 to increase thereafter in the better performing funds from
D9 to D10. Regarding fund size, and in line with findings for survivor funds, there
is no performance-related pattern; however, contrary to the evidence for the survivor
funds, in the case of non-survivor funds the worst and the best performance lie in
the largest funds within the segment of non-survivor funds.
4. CONCLUSIONS
The paper analyzes the relationship between performance and active manage-
ment for a sample of U.S. equity mutual funds, and it is free of survivorship bias.
To assess performance a multifactor model is applied, and all results are estimated
for both gross and net returns, i.e., the returns obtained by investors after deducting
management expenses.
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Table 8: COMPARING PERFORMANCE (ANNUALIZED) OF NON-SURVIVOR
AND SURVIVOR MUTUAL FUNDS
Performance difference Conditional Unconditional Conditional UnconditionalGross returns Gross returns Net returns Net returns
Non-survivor – survivor -3.14% -2.96% -3.25% -3.06%
P-value of t-test of means (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
with different variances
The table compares the performance (annualized) of non-survivor and survivor mutual funds, inclu-
ding different performance measurement and considering gross and net returns.
Source: Own elaboration.
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Figure 5: NON-SUVIVOR MUTUAL FUNDS: PERFORMANCE
(ESTIMATED WITH GROSS RETURNS) AND ACTIVE MANAGEMENT
Non-survivor mutual funds are grouped in deciles from low to high conditional performance. Esti-
mates are from results of performance from applying model [10] with gross returns. Performance is
annualized.
Source: Own elaboration.
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The study shows how mutual fund performance can be expressed as the result
of the fund managers’ strategies or investment decisions. This would imply that the
assessment of mutual fund performance by a model would be equivalent to the as-
sessment of the strategies followed by the fund using the same model. In order to
obtain a nonzero abnormal performance, fund strategies should provide different re-
sults from those obtained by a linear combination of the risk factors of the model.
Although investment strategies are not observable, it is reasonable to assume that a
greater differentiation involves a greater degree of active management and this, in
turn, implies higher expenses caused by higher portfolio turnover, information re-
trieval or management fees.
In a context where financial markets show a low level of efficiency, fund man-
agers would normally be better informed and differentiating strategies could be im-
plemented in an attempt to achieve a positive abnormal performance. However, in
a context of high efficiency, differentiation strategies could be a fruitless effort by
managers in their attempts to attain a positive and persistent performance. In the lat-
ter case, the strategies may resemble bets taken by managers, the results of which
would be, to some extent, random. Therefore, the greater the differentiation or ac-
tive management associated with these strategies, the greater the possibility that these
strategies will obtain an abnormal performance farther from zero, but for either pos-
itive or negative values.
Some of our results on performance are in line with those reported by previous
literature: in aggregate, mutual funds do not obtain a positive performance and most
of them have a negative performance. The expenses incurred by the fund for both
operating costs and, especially, management fees, have a negative effect on perfor-
mance. In aggregate, considering a time-varying model for assessing net returns, ab-
normal performance takes a negative annualized value of -1.34%. In the case of non-
survivor funds this value is worse –at -4.59%– mostly due to the effect of high
negative performance evidenced by the worst funds.
However, focusing on different tails of the distribution of performance, the
analysis of the relationship between active management and performance indicates
that both the worst and the best funds have higher levels of active management. This
is reflected in the U-shaped relationship between performance and active manage-
ment, implying that funds that try to beat the market may differentiate themselves
from it by implementing strategies that involve time-varying parameters, idiosyn-
cratic risk and, accordingly, higher turnover. However, the results of these strategies
can be very different, so that some mutual funds achieve a negative and others a pos-
itive performance. In contrast, funds that are not differentiated from the market im-
ply lower active management, lower fees and performance close to zero. For survivor
funds we found that better funds show higher idiosyncratic risk than worse funds,
but this is not the case for non-survivors, in other words, high levels of active man-
agement are accompanied by the best of worst performance.
In summary, both the worst and the best funds pursue differentiation strategies.
The open question that remains is what actually determines the outcome of these
strategies and, therefore, their classification into one group or another. Is it a fortu-
itous result in a context of efficient markets, or is it really a consequence of man-
agers’ ability? Our results give greater support to the first hypothesis. Hence, in gen-
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eral, the performance of the best and worst funds is not persistent in time, but it shows
variability and skewness, so that the worst (best) mutual funds sometimes show a
greater extreme performance with a negative (positive) sign. Significant evidence of
performance persistence is only found for the top decile funds, but their relevance
in economic terms is limited when it is compared with the expected results under a
perfect persistence hypothesis. When using net returns, the effect of differences on
the expense ratio drives evidence of significant persistence for the worst funds. There-
fore, this result is due to persistence in these higher costs rather than persistence in
the failures of managers. When we performed a more detailed analysis on the funds
at the tails of the performance distribution, we found that 2% of the top best funds
are more persistent in their successes, i.e., in pursuing differentiation strategies that
provide added value to the fund. However, there is no such evidence among the worst
funds, but the failures are not persistent. Nevertheless it should be noted that in the
analysis of persistence the non-survivor funds are not considered and within them
the worst funds obtain a markedly negative performance.
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RESUMEN
Este trabajo analiza la relación entre gestión activa y eficiencia para los fon-
dos de inversión de renta variable del mercado de Estados Unidos de Amé-
rica, durante el periodo 2001-2011 y considerando tanto rendimientos bru-
tos como netos. Se utilizan diferentes medidas de gestión activa, como la
variación temporal de parámetros, el riesgo específico y la rotación de la
cartera. Se evidencia una relación en forma de “U”, de modo que tanto los
mejores como los peores fondos muestran mayores niveles de gestión ac-
tiva. Este comportamiento también es encontrado en la relación entre los
gastos del fondo y su eficiencia. Por lo tanto, la gestión activa conlleva ma-
yores costes y la selección de diferentes estrategias o apuestas de inversión,
cuyo resultado en términos de eficiencia es desigual. No obstante, se evi-
dencia cierto nivel de persistencia en el éxito de las apuestas de inversión
realizadas por los mejores fondos.
Palabras clave: gestión activa, fondo de inversión, eficiencia.
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